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Abstract. Since 2008, Lisbon has been the irst European capital to adopt a Participatory Budget (PB) pro-
cess at a municipal scale to involve its inhabitants in the elaboration and ranking of the proposals to be in-
cluded in a predetermined slice of the city council’s budget. Lisbon’s process has become a benchmark for 
various similar experiences, both in Portugal and abroad. It brought innovative elements into the international 
debate, such as the use of new technologies to present and rank proposals, and therefore it sought to focus on 
the construction of a more “European” model of PB.
One of the innovative features of the Lisbon PB (Lx-PB) process - among the irst to be more than merely 
advisory, unlike most previous experiences in Portugal - is its evolutional nature. It allowed to capitalize and 
increase, over its various editions, a more inclusive matrix through enhanced dialogue with citizens and a 
gradual improvement of the deliberative quality, derived from various learning experiences related to errors 
and limits observed throughout the participatory path. This article - paying special attention to the incremen-
tal and evolutional nature of the experiment - aims to highlight some peculiarities of the irst ive years of life 
of the Lx-PB, stressing the limits and changes over time.
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1. Introduction
Today, when more than 2,700 municipalities around 
the world have experimented with the Participatory 
Budget (PB)1, it is worth relecting on the experience 
of Lisbon, a country that irst adapted to a European 
capital a participatory path originally developed in 
Latin America at a time when other capitals (Rome, 
Paris and London) only had pilot experiences at par-
ish level, i.e. sub-municipal institutions (UN-Habitat, 
2009). Currently, PB processes are ongoing in other 
European capitals (such as Bratislava, Reykjavik and 
Helsinki); however, the case of Lisbon remains an 
interesting one, especially because it had a broad im-
pact in Portugal. In fact, the Lisbon PB (Lx-PB) 
granted nation-wide visibility and media projection 
to the participatory budget2, thus triggering debates 
in various municipalities and some parties (especial-
ly the Portuguese Socialist Party and, within in, at the 
highest level of its Youth Organisation, Juventude 
Socialista). In that way, it focused on the transforma-
tion of the panorama of the Portuguese experience. 
Likewise, it has become an important reference in 
the lusophone world, affecting the debate about PBs 
in Cape Verde and the restructuring of the PB of 
Maputo, capital of Mozambique. Also, Lisbon is to-
day one of the cities actively involved in the so-called 
“Iberian Network of Participatory Budgets” which 
its annual event was held in Spain for the exhange of 
good practices, in March 2014.
Now in its sixth edition, the Lisbon Participatory 
Budget (Lx-PB) was one of the irst in Portugal to be 
more than merely advisory3, seeking to confer an ef-
fective decision-making power to the citizens in de-
ining part of the public policies of their municipality. 
In this sense, the experience of the Lx-PB tried to 
recover a central aspect (the co-decision aspect) of 
the original model that characterized the irst 
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Participatory Budgets in Brazil, such as Porto Alegre, that 
since 1989 (Fedozzi, 2013; Baiocchi, 2005; Santos, 2003; 
Allegretti, 2003; Abers, 2000) represented the “icon” of the 
most internationally acknowledged processes of this type. 
This recognition is not so much for being the irst experience, 
but rather because they have been implemented in a large 
state capital and in a quite radical form4. It should also be 
noted that, as happened with many European experiences 
(Sintomer and Allegretti, 2009), Lisbon PB distinguished it-
self from most of the original Brazilians processes not only 
for being a pilot project (limited to small slices of the munici-
pal budget) but also because it did not place special emphasis 
on issues related to social inclusion and redistributive justice 
on behalf of the most disadvantaged social groups.
Despite these structural limitations, it managed to differen-
tiate itself from the consultative model that prevailed in 
Portugal up until then. At the time there was a tendency to 
view the Portuguese PBs as experiences merely limited to the 
construction of a “proximity democracy” (Sintomer et alii, 
2013): that is, capable of narrowing the internal bonds of the 
social fabric and the relationships between local communities 
and municipal institutions but not capable of developing a 
bold reform of the political culture in terms of redistribution 
of power balances, namely in what pertains to the choice of 
the investments to fund with municipal resources each year.
It should be noted that the irst implementation of the 
Lisbon PB coincided not only with the worsening of the eco-
nomic and inancial crisis in the country but also with the 
territorial and operational reorganization of the Portuguese 
municipalities. In that period Portugal experienced a visible 
increase in the diffusion of innovative practices in municipal 
management, previously not very common (Mota, 2005).
This article seeks to analyze some peculiar features and 
striking transformations of the Lisbon Participatory Budget 
over its irst ive years of existence, based on the intermediate 
results of a comparative academic research project. These 
data were collected by different quantitative, qualitative and 
participant observation methodologies over two annual cy-
cles of operation in 10 Portuguese Participatory Budget expe-
riences between 2010 and the end of 20125.
2. Peculiarities and evolution of the Lisbon PB.
Participatory budgets - as deined by PB -UNIT (UK institu-
tion that supports municipalities in the implementation of this 
type of participatory practices6) - are processes that “trust de-
cisions on a portion of a municipal budget or of another bud-
get that concerns them to the citizens of a given territory”. 
The literature includes them in the scope of “invitation to 
participate” practices (Ibarra, 2007), ranking them among the 
most advanced municipal innovations (Pateman 2012, Smith, 
2009; Fung and Wright, 2002) for two main reasons: (1) for 
daring to intervene in a strategic scope of the power of the 
representative institutions that is seldom brought into public 
discussion - the distribution of public resources, and (2) for 
achieving focus, at the same time, on the perception of the 
“democratic deicit” (Norris, 2011), on the transformation of 
the political culture, on the reorganization of public services 
and on the induction of new methods of collective action.
As highlighted in the academic debate on participatory 
budgets (Sintomer and Allegretti, 2009; Wampler, 2007; 
Santos, 2003; Avritzer and Navarro, 2003), the success of 
these new innovations greatly depends on the balance of four 
factors: (1) political will, (2) organizational capacity of the 
social fabric of a territory, (3) autonomy and inancial capac-
ity of the promoter political entity and (4) organizational ar-
chitecture (or “design”) of the participatory process.
In Lisbon, the irst two elements were strengthened in 2006 
due to a political crisis that hit the city, forcing the resignation 
of the Mayor and the new mid-term elections (with a high 
abstention rate).7 The new municipal government of minority 
coalition8, led by the Socialist António Costa, felt in 2007 the 
need to create consensus that went beyond the election re-
sults. Thus, it organized thematic public participation ses-
sions and several open Decentralised Meetings in some of the 
53 parishes of the municipality9 to collect input from citizens 
and associations about plans, projects and priorities of city 
council intervention for the following years.
Following the encouraging results of the irst timid open-
ings that targeted the creation of spaces for dialogue with the 
citizens, the Lisbon City Council (CML) adopted, on 9th July 
2008, the “Charter of Principles” of the Participatory Budget, 
acknowledging the need to “proceed towards a comprehen-
sive model of citizen participation, (...) emblematic of a new 
way of governing the city.” Afterwards, Proposal 833/P/2008b 
structured a co-decision path for a portion of the investments, 
up to an amount of 5 million Euros, the highest so far in 
Portugal and corresponding to 5.4% of the investment capac-
ity of the municipality as it is stated by the oficial documents 
of the City Council.
In Lisbon, an experience with participatory budgeting was 
already in place, albeit only of an advisory nature. Located in 
the Parishes of Carnide, it was run by a coalition of opposi-
tion parties. Thus, the two processes were developed sepa-
rately (without establishing an open dialogue) and with few 
methodological afinities. In this context, the Carnide PB 
came to be extinct in 2009, since the parish decided to con-
tribute more actively within the City Council’s participatory 
path, endowed with a bigger budget and more comprehensive 
powers.
Today, the Lisbon PB operates in an annual cycle, which 
begins in the spring and continues to the summer, with sev-
eral decentralized assemblies being held in the territory: these 
are intended for proposals for investment by the citizens, who 
later become the object of evaluation and technical analysis 
by municipal services. Then, the Provisional list of Projects 
to be submitted to vote is published and a period of com-
plaints regarding the proposals analyzed is opened.
In the last quarter of the year the voting stage takes place 
(in October) and the public presentation of the winning proj-
ects (November/December) that close the annual cycle. To 
promote participation the municipality created an internet 
portal operated by the City Council, www.lisboaparticipa.pt; 
through this tool, citizens can receive information, submit 
proposals and vote, and - since 2013 - votes can also be sub-
mitted via SMS. The annual process culminates with the inte-
gration of the winning projects in the City Council’s Plan of 
Activities and Budget.
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It should be noted that many of the design elements of the 
Lx-PB, which started in late 2008, derived from a shared re-
lection with other municipalities within the project “OP 
Portugal [PB Portugal]”, an initiative supported by the 
“Equal” European funding line and coordinated by the In-
Loco Association for Local Development, in cooperation 
with the Centre for Social Studies of the University of 
Coimbra and the Centre for Municipal Studies and Training 
and even some other Municipalities and Parishes that, since 
2002, have experimented with merely advisory PB models.
In 2008, the direct inluence of the “OP Portugal” project 
- which offered free training and consulting to build innova-
tive experiences in shared management of public policies - 
had limited results, as the irst edition of the Lx-PB was con-
ined to the last quarter of the year and the interaction with 
the citizens was limited to the submission of proposals 
through a web portal not yet very user-friendly.
In the irst edition there was a waste of energy and social 
capital of the citizens who presented investment proposals, to 
the extent that they could only vote a maximum of three pri-
ority thematic areas to receive funding10. The ideas proposed 
for the other 11 areas of competence of the City Council were 
not evaluated from the technical point of view nor put to the 
public vote. These limits clearly emerged as a result of an in-
novative aspect of Lisbon’s pioneering experience (not pres-
ent in the other Portuguese PBs): a service for the monitoring 
and evaluation of the PB through questionnaires to the par-
ticipants to record their satisfaction and open suggestions for 
transformation.
The more than 1,730 participants who voted in Lx-BP 2008 
represented a tiny fraction of the population residing in the 
capital (564,650 inhabitants, according to INE) but their ac-
tivism and commitment to the process helped improve it. The 
599 questionnaires answered that year11 revealed that the 
population became aware of the process mainly through 
“word of mouth” (42.7% through friends and family), which 
triggered dynamics of self-organization of citizens and cre-
ated a high demand (72.6%) to allow for future on-site par-
ticipation in territorial or thematic meetings favouring the 
reduction of the exclusion of people with dificulties in the 
use and/or access to computer technologies.
The structure of the irst two editions of Lx-PB was marked 
by two main innovative aspects. The irst relates to universal 
participation, since - from the beginning - the Lx-PB aimed 
to cover all individuals over 18 years old living and/or work-
ing in the municipality of Lisbon, whether they were repre-
sentatives of associations and the corporate world or persons 
not afiliated with any organisation. The second was the lex-
ibility of the organizational architecture, with a view to 
the gradual improvement of the deliberative quality of the 
process. Since its conception, the PB has remained as an open 
process, continually evolving and improving, as stated in the 
eighth article of the Charter of Principles12.
Comparing the 2008 and 2009 cycles, we observe three 
signiicant changes: 1) the enrichment of the preparatory 
phase focused on building the knowledge of the different 
agents intervening in the PB, 2) the methodological change 
that put an end to the limit of three thematic areas of priority 
intervention that acted as an unwanted “ilter” on 
the autonomy of the proposals submitted by citizens; 3) the 
deinition of clear rules of participation (simple and few in 
number).
By the third year (2010), the Lx-PB began to consolidate 
itself, using its evolutionary lexibility to balance the institu-
tional formalism and its ability to change in accordance with 
the learning experiences gained. The biggest novelty of the 
2012 Lx-PB was the creation of Participatory Assemblies 
(PAs - spaces to answer questions and formulate and discuss 
proposals) and Polling Stations (PSs - support spaces for 
those who want to cast their vote, for example those who do 
not have direct Internet access at home or at their work place) 
as well as the increase of the temporal span of the participa-
tory cycle.
The annual cycle of participation - initially limited to the 
fall and early winter - gradually came to occupy the entire 
calendar year, integrating the phases shown in Figure 1:
1. Evaluation, publicitation of the report 
 and preparation of the cycle
 January to March
2. Definition of the 
 operating rules
 and amount
 March to April
3. Submission of 
 proposals 
 (on line and on-site)
 May to June
4. Technical analysis 
 and transformation 
 into projects
 July to 15th September
5. Provisional list of 
 projects and complaints
 16th september 
 to 30th september
6.  Analysis, justification 
 and preparation of 




8. The most voted projects 
 are incorporated in the 
 PA proposal and Budget 
 to be approved






Source: Câmara Municipal Lisboa [Lisbon City Council], 2010 
Figure 1. Budget process and civil society engagement 
The new articulation of the participatory cycle has multi-
plied the opportunities for debate and discussion and given 
participants the opportunity to submit proposals through sev-
eral channels simultaneously, thereby rewarding them for the 
intensity of their participatory effort.
In fact, the rules provide that those only involved through 
the PB web portal can submit only one proposal on their own 
name. In contrast, at Participatory Assemblies, each partici-
pant is entitled to submit two proposals to be put to public 
vote.
In the Participatory Assemblies the physical space is orga-
nized into several tables (each with a moderator belonging to 
the staff of the Lisbon City Council and/or external collabo-
rators) in order to facilitate the dialogue on the quality of pro-
posals. Then, in order to foster cooperation, only the valid 
proposals meeting the consensus of the participants in each of 
the tables at which they were presented are considered. In 
fact, since a maximum number of proposals that can be sub-
mitted at each table is not speciied, all proposals tend to be 
accepted by the group. This demonstrates that the tables do 
not work as “ilters”, leading to a high risk of redundancy of 
proposals. Moreover, all proposals submitted by citizens at 
the Assemblies or electronically through the Internet Portal, 
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are entered in the general list and later iltered, analyzed and 
merged (when similar or complementary) by the City 
Council’s PB team that then turns them into “projects” . 
These will go to public vote in early fall of each year. 
The analysis phase of the proposals (during Summer 
months) is the most delicate moment of the PB, since “ilter-
ing” is performed by an institutional entity and the choices 
made  by the technicians can be perceived by citizens as “dis-
cretionary”, ill-founded and – ultimately – meant to “steer” 
the instructions of the participants towards projects already 
predetermined or formatted to it speciic interests of the po-
litical institutions (Allegretti, 2013).
Over time, the rate of mergers and rejections of projects by 
the municipal technical staff has remained more or less un-
changed: for example, in 2010 31.39% (2911) of the 927 origi-
nal proposals were incorporated in the inal list, while in 20132 
the rate was 37.56 % (207 projects resulting from the 551 
original proposals). There were, however, two signiicant 
1  In “Relatório de Avaliação e Propostas da Câmara Municipal de Lis-
boa para o OP 2010-2011”, page 28.
2  In http://www.lisboaparticipa.pt/pages/noticias.php/A=259___
collection=cml_news___L=___pageID=1 (accessed on 31/10/2013).
procedural changes throughout the various editions pertaining 
to the iltering phase, meant to reduce the distrust that this 
phase could generate in participants. The irst refers to the fact 
that technical services, from 2012 onwards, contact the citi-
zens responsible for the proposals before performing any 
merger of different (or differently located) proposals that could 
be perceived as “arbitrary”.  The second concerns the com-
plaints period, part of the PB cycle since 2009 (with the release 
of a provisional list of projects in the second half of September, 
in order for citizens to comment on the result of the merger/
integration/rejection of their proposals). Undoubtedly, the pe-
riod of review of projects based on complaints has a short du-
ration (less than a week), not allowing a space for further dia-
logue and clariication of doubts on the technical analysis and 
the mergers to be performed.
To offer a brief historical summary of changes to the Lx-
PB model over time, it is worth mentioning that the outcome 
of the municipal elections in 2009 (with the victory of the 
Socialist Party and the integration of two aldermen from oth-
er political forces previously involved in the process cycle in 
2008/2009) favoured the institutional support to the PB. 
Table 1. The Lisbon PB in numbers:
Participatory Budget Cycle 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total No. of Votes 2809 4719 11570 17887 29911
Projects put to vote 89 200 291 228 231
Participants registered in the website 1732 6958 12738 26815 **
Proposals submitted 580 533
927
(492 in PAs* and 
435 online)
808
(417 in PAs* and 
391 online)
659
(288 in PAs* and 
371 online)
Source:  Câmara Municipal de Lisboa 2013 
* PAs are the on-site Participatory Assemblies of the PB. ** Data missing in the 2012 PB report. The number of registered people is 
accumulated from year to year (while in other cities the registration is performed each year).




























56-65 and > 65 
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Resident Resident Resident Resident Resident
*Each characteristic pertains only to the dominant group. Source: Câmara Municipal de Lisboa, 2011 – www.lisboaparticipa.pt 
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Thus, in 2010, a bet was made in strengthening internal hu-
man resources, carrying out training courses for employees, 
partially open to citizens also; moreover, the “PB bus” was 
created which – by circling the city - allowed a better divulg-
ing and support during the presentation and voting of projects 
stages. These efforts were rewarded by a dynamics of signii-
cant growth in the number of participants, proposals and 
projects, as evidenced by Table 1.
The new on-site participatory spaces introduced in 2009 
may have not contributed much to the increase of partici-
pants13, but it doubtless reinforced the legitimacy of the PB, 
gradually seeking to reduce exclusion through measures of 
positive discrimination. 
Table 2, comparing the dominant types of participants in 
the irst three editions of Lx-PB, shows how the introduction 
of on-site assemblies (territorial and thematic14) has diversi-
ied the public, integrating new social groups (with differenti-
ated age, professional and literacy characteristics), formerly 
marginal in the process. The PAs also brought gains to the 
development of horizontal dialogue between citizens, rein-
forcing the quality of the proposals submitted to the City 
Council. In fact, in 2010, about 43% of the proponents for-
malized their participation through PAs and a signiicant per-
centage of the winning proposals were formulated and re-
corded there. The spaces for face-to-face interaction thus 
seem to trigger more solid ideas and encourage negotiations, 
creating convergences between players. The distribution of 
participants in tables (with the support of volunteer employ-
ees, coordinated since May 2011 by DIOP) allows a more 
open and horizontal dialogue. However, this organizational 
choice did not arrive at its natural consequences, since the 
PAs could act as a “ilter” to the number of proposals, based 
on the level of participation created around them (as it hap-
pens in the city of Cascais). However, in Lisbon the number 
of ideas that can come from each table is not limited and 
those present are not required to enter selective negotiations; 
thus, the assemblies contribute to the redundancy of the over-
all number of proposals that proceed to the technical veriica-
tion phase.
In fact, the CML continues today to encourage the presence 
of residents at PAs, allowing the submission of two proposals 
per person, while the web page only allows one per person. 
This clearly illustrates the general philosophy of the Lx-PB 
that, from the outset, maintained a strongly competitive na-
ture, almost a “contest of ideas” (Dias, 2010), based on pro-
posals submitted in individual name (although often devel-
oped in a group). This characteristic tends to favour the more 
organized groups and with the greater mobilization capacity, 
not ensuring the criteria of social solidarity and/or territorial 
redistribution in the allocation of the resources assigned to 
the process.
This line of evolution is not inevitable, as it could be coun-
tered if mechanisms for greater coordination between the par-
ticipants were introduced in the proposal submission. The 
mobilization capacity seems to still be dependent on net-
works that pre-exist the PB. This fact is supported by the top 
rated projects in the irst three editions: (1) bike lanes, (2) 
expansion of the Monsanto kennel/cattery and (3) construc-
tion of a municipal rugby ield.15
Such dynamics have had heavy effects on the internal orga-
nization of CML’s “participatory machine”, given that such 
redundancy of proposals (and their frequent overlapping) re-
quired the creation of a team that, in the time limits estab-
lished in each cycle, ilters the suggestions submitted by the 
population, merging convergent ideas into coherent and ar-
ticulated projects that can be submitted to public vote. The 
veriication of the inancial and legal viability of the projects 
also requires a “variable geometry” team, of an interdepart-
mental nature broader than the three technicians formally re-
sponsible for the general organization of the annual cycle of 
PB. Until today, such tasks may also have had a negative im-
pact on the delivery dates of the projects approved in the dif-
ferent cycles of Lx-PB. The chronic delay is witnessed by the 
data provided by the Lisbon City Council16, where it can be 
seen that only 30% of the works of the last ive years of PB 
were inalized by October 2013. Although the delays are, in 
some cases, attributable to factors that escape the powers of 
the City Council (bankruptcies, negative decisions of the 
Court of Auditors, etc.), it is clear that such a low rate of im-
plementation of projects and the slow action of the City 
Council may trigger a loss of legitimacy of the process by 
generating too many expectations and frustrations on the 
citizens.
Given these inconsistencies, it is possible to conclude that 
there is an “instrumental” political view of the PB, that bets 
on the mechanism and in producing through it visible “pres-
ences” that are useful to the “benchmarking” of the Lisbon 
area (in terms of numbers of participants, the proposals sub-
mitted, etc.). However, the process displays – in subsequent 
stages - dificulties in “trusting” the inhabitants with a more 
active leading role in the control, iltering and merging of 
proposals.
The constant repetition of certain central elements in the 
initial model of the PB, six years later, suggests this interpre-
tation which, incidentally, seems to correspond to the increas-
ing perception of various social players involved in the 
process17.
3. The credibility of the PB in a context of crisis
As indicated by Avritzer (2009), the PB is simultaneously a 
very effective tool and a fragile one, as it depends of the po-
litical will to open it to a parity dialogue with the inhabitants 
and it is susceptible of being maintained under control 
through an “assisted” and partial opening. The fact that the 
PB is a voluntary policy and not an instrument provided for 
in regulatory frameworks makes it even more dependent on 
the political will of the moment, at the risk of undermining its 
sustainability and rooting in the territory and the trust of the 
population (Alves and Allegretti, 2012).
The various methodological changes of the Lx-PB over the 
years clearly relect these risks of fragility. Between 2008 and 
2009, the expansion of the proposals to 13 thematic areas 
originated dificulties in the uniformity of the analysis proce-
dures is the different services. Proof of this was the incident 
in December 2009, motivated by the fact that about 40 pro-
posals failed to be analyzed which, during the voting phase of 
the projects, resulted in a large number of complaints.
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The political vision of the Mayor not only allowed the tem-
porary suspension of the voting period and the revaluation of 
the proposals forgotten, but also introduced (for future PBs) a 
speciic period to present and evaluate complaints. This mea-
sure avoided a boomerang effect for lack of transparency and 
trust in the process and assured the Lx-PB’s visibility in the 
press, which may have contributed to the signiicant increase 
of members registered in the process in the next cycle by 
about 6958, having quadrupled the number of voters (from 
1101 to 4719).
The experience served as an example for other processes 
taking place in the country. So today, almost every Portuguese 
PB includes procedural phases for iling claims after the stage 
of technical evaluation of the proposals submitted by the 
citizens.
However, the absence of a real debate (internal to the 
CML) on the need for a change in the “a posteriori selection/
revision” of the ideas launched by the citizens may be indica-
tive of a failure to understand a feature of the PB that other 
municipalities have explicitly addressed: the fact that it is a 
more general mechanism of “social construction of reality” 
(Allegretti, 2013) in which the perceptions of the citizens (in 
relation to the good intentions and professionalism of those 
who lead the process) count, often more than the actions that 
rule the operation of each participatory cycle. In this perspec-
tive, it would be important for the future that the organizers 
of the Lx-PB provided greater space to record and relect on 
the assessments of the process made  by the participants.
Such a relection is even more important in the national 
context of economic and inancial crisis, which has brought 
to the process a new challenge: to maintain credibility and the 
conidence of the citizens in the PB in a political context of 
inancial restraint and political disbelief.
It is also worth mentioning that the ifth edition of the 
Lisbon PB was marked by a cut in global funds, which fell 
from EUR 5 million to 2.5 million18. This cut caused ample 
controversy at the level of municipal policy, which echoed in 
the media (especially because in those same days the CML 
granted inancial support to the Rock in Rio festival19) but 
resulted in less criticism from society. In fact, such a “drastic” 
choice (as it deined by the political opposition at the time it 
was adopted) communicates a policy option that could have 
generated broad discontent. That did not happen20 because 
the CML - simultaneously - bet on a new methodology ca-
pable of valuing opportunities for collective growth. For ex-
ample, in 2011 the Lx-PB allowed for the irst time the vote 
on two different groups of projects: one with the assigned 
value of 1.5 million Euros (for projects up to 150,000 €) and 
another with the value of EUR 1 million (for projects from 
500,000 € upwards). Citizens were thus entitled to two votes 
and allowed proposals and votes on works of greater and 
lesser structural and inancial dimension. This subdivision of 
categories of projects allowed for greater diversity of areas to 
be covered, beyond the commonly requested ones21 (Public 
and Green Spaces and Infrastructures). Thus, in 2012, 73% of 
the larger projects concerning the areas of environmental 
quality, comfort and accessibility of public spaces. In smaller 
projects were also covered the areas of tourism, culture and 
economic promotion in 44%22.
Also since 2012, the Lisbon City Council strengthened the 
commitment to meet the deadlines for the completion of proj-
ects, established in less than 2 years (12 months to complete 
the projects budgeted up to 150,000 € and 18 months for 
those of higher value). This commitment of the City Council 
is important in view of the low rate of implementation of ap-
proved projects. However, it should be noted that, aware of 
this aspect, the CML now offers on its Internet portal23, all 
information on the development of projects (in which it also 
explains the reasons for the delays). This portal allows citi-
zens to monitor the state of implementation of the winning 
projects. This online update proves to be crucial in terms of 
transparency, as it increases the proximity between citizens 
and institutions, ensuring greater legitimacy to the PB.
Since 2011, other improvements were also gradually intro-
duced to the Internet portal level (with new features and user-
friendlier graphics), allowing a more regular24 and diversiied 
communication (with georeferenced maps of approved proj-
ects and videos on the different steps of the process). An ef-
fort was also made to improve the cycle of participation, ex-
panding the complaints (including the entire month of 
September) and voting (from 30 to 45 days) phases of the 
proposals, preventing them from coinciding with the tradi-
tional holiday month and encouraging the participation of 
more citizens in the vote. The record of 29,911 votes achieved 
in the 2012 edition (see Table1) - which increased to 35,922 
in 2013 - may be partially a result of these measures.
In the future, it may be useful to supplement the dominant 
quantitative evaluation made to date (centred in the number 
of participants /voters, proposals and projects) with more 
qualitative forms of assessment of the impacts of the 
Participatory Budget in the quality of life in Lisbon. The irst 
opening in this direction occurred in the 2011-2012 bienni-
um, as a result of a partnership with the “Optar” project25, 
under which enquiries were distributed for the quantitative 
and qualitative analysis of Lx-PB. Some of the data thus col-
lected helps analyse issues that may be central to the future 
sustainability of the PB. They mainly relate to the perceptions 
of the participants regarding their conidence in the imple-
mentation of the projects and meeting of deadlines, the trans-
parency of the process, its intelligibility and its importance to 
city’s future.
It seems appropriate to highlight four main indings of this 
review, which question some striking fundamentals of Lx-PB 
and their consistency with the general objectives expressed in 
the 2008 “Charter of Principles”:
1. The conidence of the participants on the compliance 
with the promised deadlines for completion of the 
works approved in the Lx-PB was very low and tend-
ing to decrease over time26.
2. The assessment of the political commitment of the 
City Council with the Lx-PB is not very positive, due 
to a lower presence of the Mayor in acts related to the 
PB and a general distrust in public institutions, with 
the exception of social institutions (such as ire depart-
ments and civil protection), perceived as being almost 
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the only representatives of the positive presence of the 
State next to citizen27. 
3. The online voting mechanism is criticized for exces-
sive proposals and lack of clarity of the web portal 
(which does not clearly identify the theme category of 
the projects presented or their georeferenced loca-
tion). During the voting phase, only a minimum pro-
portion of PB participants claimed to have read all the 
projects put to vote, while most adopted individual 
strategies to make their choice, like following sugges-
tions from friends or just looking at projects in their 
own area of residence28.
4. The procedure for entry and registration of voters is 
accused of lacking a careful supervision to ensure 
equal access to inhabitants, which could reward orga-
nized lobbies and subscribers who have used false 
names or emails. The lack of controls could affect the 
credibility of the process later on and deviates from 
the liberal-competitive perspective of the Lx-PB, 
where what counts should be free enterprise of every 
citizen to propose ideas and build critical masses of 
adhesion and collective consensus around them.
In this context it seems logical that, when asked what the 
meaning of this PB model is, citizens tend to refer primarily 
(as shown in chart 2) that the PB “allows you to expose the 
problems that affect people” and “favours dialogue among 
citizens”. This view of the results is consistent with the inter-
pretation that the participants make of other complementary 
PB which, since 2011, is emerging in some parishes of the 
capital (such as Benica and S. João, for example). There, the 
main objective is to build good diagnoses of the territorial 
issues, to better articulate governance and land management. 
What does not seem to be acknowledged is the potential of 
the PB to change the political culture of the rulers. Although 
the Lisbon PB is judged by most participants as “useful” it is 
not yet considered to be very incisive, both in terms of autar-
chic transparency and in the changing of the priorities of pub-
lic management. In this sense, a recurring criticism of the 
open questions analyzed by the “Optar” project concerns the 
fact that the participatory cycle does not quite extend to the 
detailing, implementation and monitoring phase of the works 
object of co-decision.
2.91










Possibility of presenting the problems 
that affect the people
It is a useful process
It a good space of interaction with other citizens
Possibility of influencing the priorities
 of municipal investment
Possibility of taking part in CML’s decisions
 Possibility of direct contact with CML’s higher staff
Greater clarity in municipal management
Greater efficacy in municipal management
It is a process to better understand 
the operation of CML
 
Source: Relatório Optar de Lisboa, 2012
Figure 2: Signiicance of the Lisbon PB, average percentage 
of claims (signiicance values from 0 to 5)
Undoubtedly, it is necessary that - for the near future - these 
aspects be the subject of further consideration by the CML.
Indeed, the consolidation of the Lx-PB has coincided with 
the opening of other channels of participation, such as the 
Participatory School Budget (a similar process in 2011 for the 
youth of the Escola Básica 2,3 de Marvila school and that 
was extended to other schools in 2012), the local Agenda 21, 
the Priority Intervention Zones and Neighbourhoods 
Programme (BIP/ZIP), the revision of the Municipal Master 
Plan and the process of administrative reorganization of par-
ishes and of the municipality29. This is a signiicant transfor-
mation, based on a new image of the autarchy, named “Lisboa 
Participa”, which suggests that some of the limits identiied 
in the PB are not necessarily addressed and resolved within it, 
but (at a time when CML seems to incorporate the principle 
of direct participation as a central element in the politics of 
municipal governance) taken into account in building better 
links between all these additional new participation tools.
5. Learning from others? An open conclusion.
Since its oficial recognition in 2008, the Lisbon PB has 
demonstrated optimal performance in terms of growth and 
rooting in the territory, valuing the ability to evolve progres-
sively through the monitoring of both its effects and the per-
ceptions of the participants. Despite this capacity to self-re-
new some methodologies and tools each year, the process has 
been losing part of its ability to impact, having reduced to 
half (since 2011) the amount available to citizens and having 
– as well – resized the resources assigned to communication 
and the efforts made  to increase the number of assemblies.
Although having matured over time, the Lx-PB shares sev-
eral typical limits with European participatory budgets, such 
as the high degree of experimentation, the small amount of 
investment for co-decision, the absence of redistributive jus-
tice goals and of true social inclusion, the relative timidity of 
the transformation and the lack of the ambition necessary to 
make the PB a boost capable of instilling greater transparen-
cy and accountability in the slices of the municipal budget 
not directly related to the participatory path (Sintomer and 
Allegretti, 2013).
Anyway, Lisbon has preserved the guiding principles con-
tained in his founding “Charter”, seeing it almost as a “con-
stitution”, able to guide some of the signiicant changes to be 
incorporated in annual regulations throughout its irst six edi-
tions. Thus, the experience of the Lx-PB has become an im-
portant beacon for other Portuguese municipalities, being 
very stimulating because of its robustness and of the visibility 
given by the media to the capital city of a country described 
by the poet Eça de Queiroz as: “Portugal is Lisbon and the 
rest is landscape”.
Undoubtedly, both the initial amount of the PB (and later 
the School PB) and the innovative role of information tech-
nologies played a role in making Lisbon the centre of the 
change in the model of Portuguese Participatory Budgets 
(previously only advisory and raisers of speciic funds). The 
creation of a team dedicated to participatory processes and of 
clear rules of operation were also very relevant, as well as the 
annual review of the process and the commitment to training. 
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The “evolutionary” nature of the participatory budget itself 
was an important element to articulate all these speciic in-
novations and relate them to each other, added of the commit-
ment to annually measure the degree of satisfaction of the 
participants to consequently improve the process. 
Undoubtedly, the fact that the Lisbon PB surpassed the clas-
sic consultative model, launched by the city of Palmela in 
2002, helped forge a new DNA for Portuguese second gen-
eration PBs (Allegretti and Dias , 2009), centred on the co-
decision aspect and on a greater organization of the city coun-
cil as a result of the organisation and repeat of the process.
Despite this, and although faced with a public that seems to 
become, every year, more demanding, the Lx-PB has left 
some critical issues related to the model chosen unsolved. 
This, in fact, favours a formula similar to a “contest of ideas”, 
where the discussion of proposals has little space and what 
counts above all is receiving many proposals from individual 
initiatives of the proponents while the City Council plays a 
role of support and implementation of the top voted projects, 
without allowing the citizens to play a role in the co-planning 
of the implementation or even in the active control of the 
process. 
Among the issues yet to be addressed are currently those 
related to (1) demand for higher deliberative quality in the 
stages of discussion of the proposals, (2) the need to reduce 
their redundancy through “ilters” that are not technical, so 
that citizens perceive themselves as “core partners” in this 
phase, (3) and also the request for greater control over the 
identity of those enrolled in the participatory process, to en-
sure that everyone has equal access, preventing those who 
manipulate the process with ease from being rewarded when 
they try to circumvent the common rules to ensure greater 
success to their proposals.
In the process of emulation of the Lisbon experience, sev-
eral Portuguese municipalities seem to have started to pro-
vide creative responses to these limitations. For example, 
Odemira and Condeixa (since 2010-2011) have faced the 
problem of the stricter control of registrations, creating for 
that purpose a password system that is linked to the one-stop 
services. Condeixa and Trofa have invested in a multiple vote 
system so that citizens are encouraged to read all the projects 
submitted before the inal vote, rather than merely voting on 
their own project. The Guimarães PB scheduled over 48 
meetings for 2013 to build a widespread network of spaces of 
dialogue about the content of the proposals (even in more 
remote villages). As for Cascais, this has been the municipal-
ity more capable of facing the unresolved problems of the 
Lisbon experience, particularly with regards to the good co-
ordination of the PB with other instruments of planning and 
visioning. Since 2011, Cascais stimulated high quality de-
bates on its citizen’s proposals, built ongoing training oppor-
tunities for technicians on participation techniques and in-
volved citizens in the detailing and control of the completion 
of projects; most notably, it gave the participants in the PB an 
active role in reducing the redundancy of the proposals, with-
out betting on “ilters and bottlenecks” entrusted to adminis-
trative and institutional/political players, which could threat-
en public trust in the PB.
The hope is that, from this point forwards, Lisbon will not 
renounce to drawing on creative solutions positively experi-
mented in other cities, thus beneiting from the many contacts 
that its centrality guarantees, not becoming a prisoner of a 
self-referentiality that runs the risk of wasting the beneits 
that networking has ensured in many examples of the second 
generation of Portuguese participatory budgets.
A irst indicator that such a position may produce positive 
results not only for Lisbon but for experiences throughout the 
country comes from a novelty introduced in 2013 in the vot-
ing of the Lx-PB projects. Inspired by the Cascais PB, the 
Lisbon City Council adopted the use of SMS as the main vot-
ing tool; however, upon realising that it was impossible to 
reach an agreement with all telephone companies for sending 
free SMSs to vote, it avoided the repeat of Cascais’ mistake 
(which abolished other forms of voting) and preserved the 
possibility of voting via the Internet and through the “PB 
bus” that travels the city during the entire month of October. 
Also, the commitment of Lisbon’s administration in promot-
ing and co-organising the 2nd Meeting of Iberian PBs relects 
the will to play a more humble and relective role in the scope 
of the experiences in the peninsula, capable of simultane-
ously being a “receiver” and a “multiplier “ of the different 
innovations that will quickly change the landscape of 
European participatory budgets.
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Notes
1  Sintomer et alii, 2013.
2  See the news report published by “Público” newspaper on 28/04/2013 
and several articles published in “Público”, “Diário de Noticias” and 
“I” between 2008 and 2012.
3  The Lisbon PB is not the irst of decisory nature in Portugal, but it is 
the largest. Since 2006, there was the case of Sesimbra (52,000 inhab-
itants, a successful experience discontinued in 2011) which already 
provided for - as in the Brazilian models - the election of neighbour-
hood delegates to co-decide on an amount between 300,000 and 
500,000 Euros (Sintomer and Allegretti, 2013).
4  Since its beginning in 1989, the Porto Alegre process assigned 100% 
of the investments to the PB, so (compared to other major cities) it 
has always been considered a radical experience. Anyway, this value 
has changed over time, decreasing widely - especially after a policy 
change in 2005 ( proven by Langelier’s 2013 thesis and anticipated in 
the article published by Le Monde Diplomatique - Langelier, 2011)
5  It’s the project “O Orçamento Participativo Como Instrumento Inova-
dor Para Reinventar as Autarquias em Portugal e Cabo Verde: uma 
Análise Crítica da Performance e dos Transfers”, funded by FCT 
(PTDC/CS-SOC/099134/2008 - FCOMP-01-0124-FEDER-009255). 
These relections also owe much to the Project “Cidade e Alteridade: 
Convivência Multicultural e Justiça Urbana”, co-inanced by a FCT/ 
CNPQ partnership (4.4.1.00). The authors thank Robert Falanga and 
Nelson Dias for their suggestions and corrections.
6  See http://www.participatorybudgeting.org.uk
7  The abstention rate was 62.2% (INE).
8  Before the re-election in October 2009, the Government led by Costa 
had not secured a majority in the Municipal Assembly, for which the 
elections were not repeated in 2007.
9  After the Administrative Reform imposed by Law 56/2012 the city is 
divided in 24 parishes, decentralised political and administrative enti-
ties created according to the old medieval parishes.
10  The priority areas selected in 2008 by the participants were: “Road-
works Infrastructures, Trafic and Parking” (123 proposals), “Public 
Spaces and Green Spaces” (122 proposals), “Urbanisation and Urban 
Rehabilitation” (62 proposals). Only proposals related to these areas 
were evaluated by the municipal services from a technical point of 
view. The remaining 273 proposals (in eleven other areas of compe-
tence of the CML) were automatically removed from the process.
11   Representing 34.5% of the participants.
12  “The results (...) are evaluated each year and the alterations necessary 
to the progressive improvement, deepening and widening of the pro-
cess are introduced”.
13  Polling stations (spaces of “assisted participation” for those who do 
not have an internet connection or computer literacy to be able to 
vote) in 2010 collected about 2% of the total votes. The same hap-
pened with the PB bus.
14  The regional assemblies are developed in different parishes (group-
ing several areas); the so-called “thematic” assemblies are sectoral 
meetings which since 2010 allow the promotion of the PB with dif-
ferent social groups in the city, such as the elderly, children and uni-
versity students. Between 2011 and 2012 meetings for foreigners, 
architects and designers, merchants and other target-categories were 
developed.
15  The irst was supported by the Portuguese Cycling Federation, the 
second by animal protection movements and the third by athletes and 
family members with a connection to the sport (Dias in Sintomer and 
Allegretti, 2013).
16  Interview with the coordinator of the PB on 14th October 2013 (in 
the scope of the “OPtar” Project).
17  There are clear convergences in that direction between the question-
naires distributed in the scope of the “OPtar” Project on which this 
article was based and the PB Reports prepared by CML in 2009-
2012.
18  The same ratio of cuts was applied to the School PB, a process for the 
participation of young students that, in the irst pilot edition of 2010, 
included 50,000 Euros in investments.
19  Rock in Rio is a music festival originated in Brazil, designed by 
Brazilian entrepreneur Roberto Medina and irst held in 1985; since 
its inception it is acknowledged as the biggest music festival of the 
Latin world. It was originally organized in Rio de Janeiro but has 
become a world level event and, in 2004, had its irst edition abroad 
in Lisbon, where it has been held 5 times.
20  This is proven by surveys collected by the “OPtar” project, in which 
subjects reported their satisfaction with the value put to discussion. 
In 2011 (on a scale of 0-5), satisfaction declared by over 2800 re-
spondents reached the mean value of 3.05 (above the average of the 
suficiency of 2.5), while in 2012 the satisfaction rose to an average 
of 3.24 (OPtar Reports, 2011 and 2012).
21  See CML’s 2011/2012 PB Report, page 24.
22 See CML’s 2012/2013 PB Report, page 18
23 See http://www.lisboaparticipa.pt/pages/orcamentoparticipativo.php/
A=110___collection=cml_article (accessed on 30th October 2013).
24  A notable exception concerns the scheduling of PAs, which dates are 
usually broadcast a few days earlier, and (in 2013) only much earlier 
in the process’ Facebook page.
25 See footnote 5.
26  On the question on general opinions regarding the PB, the “proposals 
approved in the PB are important and change the quality of life” col-
lects an average of 3.93 (out of 5) for both years, while the option 
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“the proposals approved will be implemented by the City Hall” col-
lects an average of 3.93 in 2011 and down to 3.55 in 2012. The belief 
that the deadlines for the works will be respected gets a lower rating: 
3.02 in 2011 and 2.99 in 2012 (Optar Reports 2011 and 2012). These 
averages are higher in questionnaires distributed in PAs, while the 
more educated public of the online questionnaires proves to be more 
hypercritical.
27  In the question pertaining to the level of conidence in the various 
political and social institutions, the participants in the 2012 PB men-
tion a mean value of only 1.52 (out of 0 to 5) for the President of the 
Republic, 1.53 for the Government, 1.67 for political parties, 2.67 for 
city councils, 3.65 for Associations and 4.04 for ire departments and 
civil protection (Optar Report, 2012).
28  On a scale of 0 to 5, the satisfaction expressed with the assessment 
and merger procedures is, in average, of 2.98 (in 2011) and 3.02 (in 
2012), while in 2012 only 14.8% of respondents declares having read 
all the projects before voting.
29  The Local Agenda XXI process (begun in 2012) is still incipient and 
aims to create a common interdisciplinary and cross-sectional (in the 
mid-term) area of  debate on issues related to environmental sustain-
ability. The BIP/ZIP Program - winner of the 2013 International De-
mocracy Observatory Award - is supported by a special fund, which 
annually distributes resources to project proposals for problematic 
neighbourhoods of the city meant to boosting the economic, social 
and urban fabric through partnerships between different organiza-
tions active in the territory. A mandatory review of the Master Plan 
was required by law, to which the CML added a broad social debate 
which (in 2011) primarily involved organized and professional ter-
ritorial planning groups. In the end, the path of social dialogue cre-
ated for the administrative reform aimed to better support the reorga-
nization of parishes, before the Government took rushed reform 
measures (based on the commitments of the Troika Memorandum 
concerning solutions for the crisis) ignoring the territorial and his-
torical speciicities of the local political and administrative division.
